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1   Introduction 
As data and information is stored, combined and accessed almost everywhere, in-
formation security and privacy becomes increasingly important to companies that 
offer access to data. In comparison to network and hardware security that often focus 
on the protection of network or hardware from attackers from the outside, information 
security involves protection of certain information from users that have at least some 
access rights ‘inside’ an information system. One key challenge in information secu-
rity and privacy is to meet two contrary goals at the same time, i.e. to allow users to 
run applications which access the data that they need, but to prevent the same users 
from being able to infer sensitive information from the results returned by the appli-
cation.  
While cryptography may be used as a supporting technology, the focus of our re-
search at the University of Paderborn is to solve problems of information security and 
privacy. Our research involves different aspects of information security and privacy, 
e.g. access control, policies, key management, role management, inference control, 
detection of privacy leaks, sovereign information sharing and anonymous union com-
putation. Although there are many great contributions to these problems by other 
groups in the community, within this paper, we focus on the research contributions by 
our group in Paderborn. 
2   Different approaches to view-based XML access control  
We have investigated a variety of techniques for access control in XML databases, 
ranging from proof techniques to query modification. The proof technique-based 
approach at first computes the read set of query, i.e. the information that has to be 
accessed in order to answer a query [12]. The read set is usually a superset of the 
answer returned by the query. Given this read set, access control has to check whether 
or not the read set is a subset of the access right. This is done by a containment test 
for XPath expressions, that checks query containment between the read set of a user 
XPath query and an access right, i.e. whether or not the result selected by the read set 
of a user query is contained in the result selected by the access right for every XML 
database state that is valid according to a given DTD [10], [11].  
Some approaches use predicate to describe that part of an XML database to which 
access is prohibited instead of to describe to which part of an XML database access is 
allowed. In such a case, access control has to check whether the intersection of the 
read set and an XPath expression describing the forbidden part is empty. We have 
developed intersection tester for XPath expressions that consider additional structural 
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constraints of the XML document given by a DTD, [9], and an intersection tester that 
considers structural constraints given by an XML schema definition [7].  
Furthermore, we have developed a query modification based-approach for XML 
databases, [8], that is based on query rewriting and substitution. The key idea is to 
express access constraints as security views and to apply XPath queries to these secu-
rity views, i.e. users can never access any information that is not contained in the 
security view. By applying queries to security views, we get nested views or nested 
XPath queries. A second step of this approach is therefore to optimize these nested 
queries - which we do by rewrite rules. Furthermore, we have extended the query 
rewriting and optimization approach to XQuery [2].    
3   Anti-inference and finding information leaks  
Whenever secret company information that can be accessed by multiple users is il-
legally leaked to a third party, it is crucial for the company to identify the information 
leak. We especially focus on scenarios where the information is leaked from a person 
that has an access right to the leaked information. We call this kind of information 
leakage an attack from the inside - in comparison to attacks from the outside where 
people who do not have an access illegally right try to access secret information. 
While access control helps to prevent attacks from the outside, access control is not 
applicable to our scenario where multiple users have an access right to the secret 
information.  
Instead our problem is related to inference and anti-inference, i.e., the question is 
which of the users that have an access right to secret information that has been leaked 
by someone, did actually submit queries and did retrieve answers that are sufficient to 
infer the leaked information. In other words, given the knowledge which an attacker 
can infer from his queries and his answers, can he or can’t he infer the leaked secret 
information.  
In the context of XML databases and XPath queries, we have reduced the problem 
of finding information leaks to the problem of computing an answer to a database 
query describing the secret from another answer to a user database query. Further-
more, we have investigated some necessary conditions on the structure of XPath 
queries that have to be met, such that the answer to a query can be inferred from a 
previously answered query [4], [6].  
4   Sovereign information sharing among malicious partners 
The goal of sovereign information sharing is to share common information without 
a trusted third party and uncovering non-common information to the other party. For 
example, consider two companies that want to know, who are their common custom-
ers, because they assume that customers try to play them off. Of course, no company 
wants to uncover information about a customer that is not a common customer. Even 
more, the goal is to have fair information exchange, i.e. one company shall get the 
knowledge of a common customer if and only if the other company gets the same 
knowledge. Previous protocols that have been proposed for that problem always as-
sume an honest but curious behaviour [1].  
However our approach [5] solves a much more challenging scenario, because in 
addition to the fairness requirement, we assume that participants may act malicious, 
i.e., our protocol shall solve the following additional problems.  
1. One participant may fake customer data, e.g. take the yellow pages and claim 
all the entries are his customers. The protocol shall detect faking and avoid 
damage to the other participant.  
2. One participant may inspect, suppress or invent messages. The protocol shall 
avoid disadvantages from message inspection by the partner and shall detect 
all manipulations of messages by the other participant.  
3. One partner may stop the protocol at any point in time. The protocol shall 
avoid disadvantages or damage for the other partner.  
We could prove that no fair protocol exists that meets all these requirements. In-
stead, each protocol requires a minimum amount of risk, i.e. to give some information 
for which partner may not get the fair information equivalent. However, we could 
show that it is possible to reduce the damage that one partner would suffer at most by 
any kind of malicious behaviour (message inspection, message suppression, invention 
or modification, or invention of faked data) is one information unit, i.e. on customer 
in our example. Furthermore, there is a trade-off between risk and trust on one side 
and efficiency on the other side, i.e. the higher the risk and trust the more efficient the 
data exchange and sovereign information sharing can be implemented.  
5   Anonymous union computation  
Contrary to the sovereign information sharing problem, in anonymous union com-
putation, the result that shall be computed and shown to all participants is the union 
of all the shared information. However, the source of each particular piece of infor-
mation contributed to the union shall remain anonymous in all non-trivial cases1, and 
there may be more than two partners contributing to the computed union.  
Applications include medical information collection systems that aim to collect 
and share information about existing diseases (HIV, influenza, etc.) in a group of 
participants without uncovering which participant suffers from which disease.  
Our approach [3] computes the union of multiply encrypted values. Anonymity of 
the origin of tuples is guaranteed by a data exchange protocol that shuffles encrypted 
values and distributes them using different paths and by mixing in faked tuples that 
are later on detected as fakes.  
Protocol manipulation can be detected by a decryption-based proof technique, and 
as for sovereign information sharing with malicious partners, if a participant act mali-
cious or stops the protocol at any point in time, the damage for the other partners can 
be reduced to be one information unit only.  
                                                          
1 A trivial case is that we only have two parties and each party knows that information found in 
the union which it did not contribute itself must be contributed from the other party.  
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